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European Union, and criminal, laws had been interacting in many ways even before 
explicit competence in criminal matters was acquired by the Union in the Treaty of 
Maastricht. Such intersections between supranational and national provisions have 
frequently been handled by the CJEU. In the main, the intervention of the Court is 
triggered by Member States’ recourse to penal sanctions in situations covered by EU law. 
In such cases, the CJEU is called upon to strike a complicated balance: it has to deal with 
Member States’ claims of competence in criminal law, whilst ensuring that that power is 
used consistently with EU law. By making reference to selected cases, this paper highlights 
the impact that principles established in the context of the fundamental freedoms can have 
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European Union (EU)I law is not just a framework of coexisting watertight areas. Quite 
the opposite, it is a ‘whole’ whose constituent parts are highly connected and influence 
each other. As time has gone by, many bricks have built up and strengthened such a 
connection, with the Court of Justice of the European Union (‘the Court’ or the ‘CJEU’) 
playing a major role in this respect. This paper aims to put another brick in this ‘whole’, 
and to discuss how the Court’s case-law on free movement can improve fundamental 
rights’ protection in EU criminal law. By EU criminal law, I mean: the instruments adopted 
by the Union according to the competences conferred in the Treaty,II as well as the law of 
the former ‘third pillar’; the interaction between EU and national criminal law. 
Interdependence is an inherent feature in the EU; where interaction takes place not 
only among the different areas of Union law, but also between the latter and national 
systems. This is even truer as far as penal law is concerned. Many principles usually traced 
back to EU criminal law have been firstly stated and developed in the context of free 
movement. What is more, in many cases this has resulted in heightening the standard of 
protection of individual rights. Three different expressions of interaction can be seen 
here.III Firstly, the impact of EU law on Member States’ (MS) law has concerned the 
infringements of EU law provisions, criminalised at national level, where the CJEU has set 
aside those MS’ rules that limited the rights established by EU law in a disproportionate 
manner.IV  
Secondly, the use of criminal penalties has been upheld by the EU as a tool in 
maintaining the effectiveness of EU law. The “Greek Maize” case is the landmark judgment 
in this respect.V The Court, by founding its reasoning on effectiveness, established the 
principle of assimilation. Here the obligation is for MS to treat comparable violations of 
Community and national law with analogous means, for MS reactions to amount to effective, 
proportionate and dissuasive penalties, and for these to be enforced with the same diligence as 
those applied to national situations. Though initially used in isolation, the Greek Maize 
‘formula’ has progressively been accompanied by an explicit obligation for MS to impose 
penalties involving deprivation of liberty. 
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In the third way of interaction, criminal law principles have been regarded as general 
principles of EU law, particularly in order to ensure the application of Union law in 
compliance with the principles of legal certainty and non-retroactivity in criminal 
proceedings.VI The Treaty of Lisbon has resulted in the enhancement of the potential in 
terms of mutual impact among the different areas of EU law; which can be mostly ascribed 
to the collapse of the pillar-based structure of the EU.  
In this respect, the existing case-law of the Court offers further opportunities to 
strengthen the protection of individuals in EU criminal law through the use of the 
principles stated in the context of free movement. Broadly speaking, the interplay between 
criminal law and free movement has increased at the EU level over the years, with two 
broad fronts of interaction emerging in particular. On the one hand, we have seen the use 
of the legal rules, and their interpretation by the CJEU, where criminal law is overtly 
resorted to. In the Area of Freedom Security and Justice (AFSJ), criminal law is explicitly 
used in EU instruments since the Union has specific competences in this respect. On the 
other hand, there are extensive areas of EU law where criminal law is not mentioned, since 
this would fall outside the Union powers; this is the case of the internal market and 
fundamental freedoms. In this way penal rules are put under the spotlight by the 
interaction between EU and national laws, with the Court deliberating on the role attached 
to criminal penalties.  
The high relevance of the interaction between fundamental freedoms (or, more 
broadly, Union law) and criminal law has been extensively analysed.VII Indeed, free 
movement has been, and is, the core of EU law since the latter was born, though many 
other areas have been gaining ground over the years (such as citizenship and criminal law). 
Right from the establishment of the EU, national provisions of criminal law have been 
increasingly covered by the law of the four freedoms (consisting of the Treaty and 
secondary law). Thereby, the chance for both kinds of rules (national and supranational) to 
interact has significantly heightened. Such dynamics have triggered many interpretative 
dilemmas, the resolution of which have been referred to the CJEU by national judges. In 
these contexts, the CJEU has been asked to find an equilibrium between economic 
freedoms and state sovereignty in criminal law. Two fundamental questions arise in this 
respect: is criminal law restricting, or capable of restricting, a fundamental freedom; and if 
so, may such a restriction be allowed? 
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Many studies have focused on the use of general principles by the CJEU in this area,VIII 
and its impact on criminal law. Therefore, in this paper I discuss possible consequences for 
EU criminal law that have not been explored in-depth so far. I select a restricted number 
of Court’s rulings, and outline two main scenarios. As for the choice of the judgments, a 
key criterion has been the value of primary law taken on by the Charter of Fundamental 
Rights of the EU (CFREU or the Charter). I am interested in dealing with the possible 
impact of free movement case-law on fundamental rights in EU criminal law. Therefore, I 
analyse those judgments explicitly referring to a fundamental right or a general principle 
now enshrined in the Charter.  
The first scenario regards the use of the principle of proportionality; here I argue that 
the CJEU’s use of the principle where criminal law encounters the fundamental freedoms 
has been largely beneficial to individuals. Such interactions have given the Court the 
opportunity to develop a manifold application of the principle of proportionality to 
criminal penalties featured at the national level. In this part I present the cases of Skanavi IX 
and Awoyemi.X As mentioned above, there is an extensive case-law of the Court’s limitation 
of MS’s use of criminal penalties in light of the principle of proportionality. Such a restraint 
has often been based on the argument that the measure in question was so 
disproportionate that it hampered the exercise of free movement. I decided to focus on 
Skanavi and Awoyemi as they examined exactly the same situation (driving in a host Member 
State with a non-recognised licence) and the same penalty (criminal sanctions, in particular 
imprisonment and a fine). The only difference lies in that Mrs Skanavi was an EU national, 
while Mr Awoyemi was not. Therefore, I jointly read these two decisions to contrast the 
differences between the proportionality test applied by the Court to an EU citizen, and that 
applied to a third-country national.  
From this, I stress the importance of EU citizenship to the application of 
proportionality in criminal law. Admittedly, these judgments were issued before the 
adoption of the Charter; however, the CFREU now provides for the universal principle of 
proportionality of penalties in Article 49(3). I argue that the relationship established by the 
Court between the enjoyment of such a principle and the entitlement to free movement 
requires clarification, in light of the legally-binding value taken on by the Charter. 
The second scenario concerns the possible non-implementation of EU secondary law 
on fundamental rights grounds, where I deal with the BerlusconiXI and CaronnaXII rulings. In 
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this scenario, the cases form part of a consistent case-law of the Court of Justice, according 
to which criminal liability cannot be directly determined or aggravated by EU law, without 
a national law of implementation. Here I argue that the Court allowed the possible non-
compliance of national law with EU secondary law. It did so by arguing that the 
implementation of the latter might have caused the infringement of a general principle or a 
fundamental right. At stake in particular was the principle of legality now enshrined in 
Article 49 CFREU. The first reason for choosing these cases is that the CJEU backed up 
its argument by explicitly referring to a general principle (as is the case of Berlusconi) or a 
fundamental right of criminal law (Article 49 Charter in Caronna).  
Furthermore, in Berlusconi the Court was faced with the contrasting effect of three 
subsequent laws: (1) EU company law; (2) the first Italian law which correctly implemented 
it, by the introduction of effective (criminal) penalties for violations of EU law; (3) the 
subsequent Italian law, which partially decriminalised offences provided for in the first law, 
and posed for that reason serious doubts of compatibility with the Union rules concerned.  
The preliminary ruling arose in the context of criminal proceedings, which regarded 
conducts (allegedly) committed under the first Italian law, but which were then 
decriminalised by the second one. However, the latter law was potentially not in 
compliance with EU law for lack of effectiveness. The Court was essentially asked as to 
whether such non-compliance could result in setting aside the subsequent Italian law, so 
opening the door to the criminal liability of the persons concerned.  
The scenario depicted makes Berlusconi a perfect showcase for analysing the relationship 
between the implementation of EU secondary law and the protection of fundamental 
rights. Likewise, Caronna concerned the possibility of determining criminal liability directly 
on the basis of an EU directive. In that judgment the Court was clear in finding that 
respect for the Charter would prevail even where national law is contrary to EU law. As 
clarified below, I argue that the rationale behind the decisions in the second scenario 
provides EU criminal law with an important tool to better protect fundamental rights in 
the context of mutual recognition.  
The article is structured as follows. I firstly deal with the scenario regarding 
proportionality, and I present the cases of Skanavi and Awoyemi. I then discuss their 
importance for EU criminal law, taking into consideration in particular Article 49(3) 
CFREU. Secondly, I address Berlusconi and Caronna. In this part I try to show how the cases 
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can be highly relevant to mutual recognition in criminal matters. Lastly, I recall the topics 
touched upon, and I argue that the case-law of the CJEU can be used to enhance 
protection of individuals. 
 
2. EU Citizenship and Proportionality 
 
2.1. Skanavi and Awoyemi 
The question in Skanavi arose in the context of criminal proceedings against Mrs 
Skanavi and her husband, Mr Chryssanthakopoulos, who were charged with driving 
without a licence. According to German Law, the conduct was an offence punishable by 
imprisonment or a fine. As far as EU law is concerned, driving licences were first 
harmonised by First Council Directive 80/1263/EEC of 4 December 1980 on the 
introduction of a Community driving licence.XIII That instrument in particular set a system 
for the mutual recognition and the exchange of driving licences, when the holder had 
her/his residence or workplace in another MS. By virtue of that directive, when the holder 
of a valid driving licence took up residence in another MS, the licence would remain valid 
for up to a maximum of a year after the establishment of residency. At the request of the 
holder within that period, and against surrender of the licence, the host MS was to issue the 
driver with a Community model driving licence for the corresponding category or 
categories without requiring the holder, inter alia, to pass a practical and theoretical test or 
to meet medical standards. According to the subsequent Directive 91/439/EEC,XIV the 
holder of a valid driving licence residing in another MS was not obliged to exchange it.  
The Court was firstly asked whether, as EU law stood prior to the implementation of 
the latter directive, a MS could require the holder of a driving licence issued by another MS 
to exchange that licence within one year from the establishment of the residence in the 
host State, in order to retain the entitlement to drive in the state. The Court recognised that 
the rules concerning driving licence can have a significant impact on the freedom of 
movement for workers, as well as on the freedom of establishment and provision of 
services.XV The Court also found that the gradual harmonisation carried out at EU law level 
allowed MS to retain some powers in this respect. Such a latitude included requiring the 
holder of a valid licence to exchange it in the MS where s/he had moved to.  
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The Court was further asked whether the Treaty precluded the act of driving of a 
motor vehicle by a person who had not exchanged licences from being treated as driving 
without a licence, and thus rendered punishable by imprisonment or a fine. The Court 
acknowledged that the obligation to exchange the licence was compatible with EU law, but 
also that it constituted a mere administrative requirement.  
Though the MS remain competent with regard to the use of criminal law, the latter 
must be used in such a way as not to obstruct free movement. This is especially the case 
when it comes to imprisonment,XVI where on that ground the CJEU ruled that EU law 
prohibited MS from treating driving without the exchanging of the licence as a criminal 
offence, since it would jeopardise the enjoyment of free movement.XVII 
Awoyemi regarded exactly the same situation as that occurred in Skanavi, but the 
difference laid in the fact that the person concerned was a third-country national. The 
Court was asked whether EU law precluded MS from treating driving without exchanging a 
licence as a criminal offence. The Court found that the former directive applied irrespective 
of nationality, and also recalled Skanavi, when stating that MS must use criminal law in 
compliance with EU law and the principle of free movement.XVIII However, the Court 
found that a person such as Mr Awoyemi, as a third-country national, may not rely on the 
principle of free movement of persons, which applies only to a national of a MS.XIX As the 
law stood at that moment, the position of the person concerned was not governed by 
provisions of EU law, as he was not entitled to free movement.  
The Court mitigated this statement by means of the principle of retroactivity of a more 
favourable norm. The Court relied on the applicability of Directive 91/439/EEC on 
driving licences, which in the interim had substituted Directive 80/1263/EEC. The newest 
directive imposed on MS the prohibition of the requirement to exchange driving licences 
issued by another MS, regardless of the nationality of the holder. The Court recognised 
that the situation of Mr Awoyemi fell under the principle that an individual may rely - 
against the State - on provisions of a directive which are unconditional and sufficiently 
precise, where that State failed to: transpose the directive within the prescribed period, or 
implement the directive correctly.XX On that ground, the Court found that EU law allowed 
a national judge, by reason of the principle that forms part of national law in certain MS of 
the retroactive effect of more favourable provisions of criminal law, to apply such a 
provision even where the offence took place before the date set for compliance with that 
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directive. The Court recalled the principle of the retroactive effect of more favourable 
provisions of criminal law. 
 
2.1. Impact in Terms of Proportionality 
The cases discussed above are highly relevant to EU criminal law, and they are also 
interesting because judgements were given when the Charter did not have legally-binding 
value. Therefore, it is appropriate to raise the question as to how the principle stated 
therein can be upheld in the EU legal framework as developed by the Treaty of Lisbon. At 
stake there is in particular the interaction between different understandings of the principle 
of proportionality. As is well-known, that principle has been used to balance (inter alia) 
fundamental freedoms and national laws. Eminent scholars have debated on the principle 
of proportionality in general terms,XXI as well as with particular reference to EU law.XXII In 
the latter area, it has been highlighted that the multiform application of proportionality 
depends on the peculiarities of the area of law at stake, and the nature of the interests 
involved.XXIII 
As provided for in Article 5 of the Treaty of EU (TEU), proportionality is a polestar 
(jointly with the principle of subsidiarity) for the Union in the application of its 
competences. The proportionality test famously provides that: the means adopted are 
appropriate to achieve the objectives legitimately pursued (suitability test); the means 
adopted are necessary in order to achieve the objectives legitimately pursued (necessity 
test); and the means adopted should not impose an excessive burden on the individual 
(proportionality stricto sensu). Put simply, the principle of proportionality under EU law 
requires that a legitimate aim be pursued through the least intrusive measure for 
individuals. Furthermore, Article 52 CFREU states that limitations on the exercise of the 
rights and freedoms recognised by the Charter are subject to the principle of 
proportionality. In this sense, evaluating criminal law on the basis of this principle of 
proportionality is to examine how the MS justify their use of criminal law, and more 
specifically, how criminal law is related to a given objective, and which function the former 
is supposed to fulfil.  
However, this principle has also a criminal law understanding.XXIV Scholars have written 
extensively on the reach of proportionalityXXV at EU criminal law level, and on its 
interaction with the principle of subsidiarity in criminal law.XXVI Given that the debate on 
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the meaning of these principles is huge, I can just try to simplify it for the purposes of this 
paper. The interaction between the meanings of proportionality and subsidiarity in EU law 
and (EU) criminal law is highly relevant. As they can overlap and be understood in more 
than one way, their interaction can significantly impact on the individuals concerned. 
Subsidiarity in criminal law (also known as ultima ratio or last resort principle) means 
that penal sanctions should be resorted to only where other instruments would be 
insufficient to protect the interests at stake. This is the outer dimension of ultima ratio,XXVII 
which looks at criminal law in relation to other less intrusive legislative means. As Husak 
states, it focuses on the alternatives to punishment, rather than on what kind of punishment 
to prefer and alternative means of punishment.XXVIII  
In this sense, Giudicelli-Delage argued that the necessity under EU law proportionality 
test is imbued not only with a utilitarian logic (relation between means and end), but also 
with the principle of criminal law as ultima ratio. Therefore, such a necessity would cover two 
fundamental guarantees: punishing “as long as it is useful and as long as it is fair. The 
legitimacy of punishment rests on its fairness and usefulness. The combination of these 
two principles is key to establishing conditions and limits of punishment (…), since 
considering both of them in isolation would lead to dangerous consequences”.XXIX  
Such a picture is made even more complicated by the advent of the Charter with a 
legally-binding value, where Art. 49,XXX established the proportionality test between the 
level of punishment and the seriousness of the offence. Furthermore, the evaluation of 
proportionality under criminal law involves both the legislative and the sentencing levels, 
that is to say the penalties as provided by the law and applied to the concrete cases by the 
judges.XXXI  
The Court’s judgments in Skanavi and Awoyemi show exactly the importance of these 
different understandings. In the cases, the application of the principle of proportionality 
has been linked to the entitlement to free movement, which applies to persons satisfying 
the following conditions: being an EU citizen; having moved to another MS; having been, 
or being engaged in some economic activity in the MS where s/he has moved to. The 
reach of the Treaty freedoms is expanded to include covering the driving licence system. 
As such the protection offered by free movement law is significantly enhanced, so that the 
compatibility of criminal sanctions with EU law is tested in light of this enlarged 
dimension. The consequence is evident: the broader the area within which criminal law is 
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required to be consistent, the higher the chances that it will be found not in compliance 
with EU law. Personal liberty might have been treated as an instrument for the purposes of 
exercising an economic freedom. More than one question arises in this respect: are there 
penalties which are disproportionate while not hindering free movement, and if so, how 
could they be justified? However, one should not overlook that in cases such as those 
discussed, the Court ruled on the compliance of a national measure with Treaty freedoms, 
so that the latter are assumed as a benchmark of lawfulness. Furthermore, in a way the 
CJEU is deciding on the fairness of a national criminal law system, in a moment where a 
(weak) Union competence in criminal matters had just come into being. 
Nonetheless, such an approach may have its drawbacks, as seen in Awoyemi; in this case 
the Court was true to the general principle according to which the free movement law 
applies only to EU citizens, so that an individual may be subject to a penalty which the 
Court has explicitly recognised as disproportionate, if applied to EU citizens. One may 
uphold the CJEU coherence as follows; a criminal penalty is disproportionate where related 
to the exercise of free movement, that sanction ceases to be disproportionate, when 
applied to a person not entitled to free movement.  
Granted, there are at least two elements that must be considered in the analysis of the 
case. Firstly, at that time the Charter had not yet been adopted. Secondly, the Court might 
have opted for that interpretation because there were no elements capable of triggering the 
application of EU law. Indeed, at stake there was the protection of the exercise of free 
movement. The principle of free movement could not apply, because in that case Mr 
Awoyemi fell outside the scope of EU law: neither the Treaty, nor secondary law, governed 
that situation.  
That said, it must be pointed out that there was relevant EU law in the area, namely 
Directive 91/439/EEC, confirmed by the fact that the Court resorted to it when applying 
the principle of retroactivity of more favourable provisions of criminal law. However, it 
was not considered a matter of EU law because the person concerned did not enjoy free 
movement.  
The main problem in upholding such a hands-off approach is that it takes for granted 
the link between the application of the principle of proportionality and the entitlement to 
free movement. Indeed, the Court found that the penalty was lawful, and proportionality 
did not apply exactly, because that principle was subject to the exercise of free movement. 
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This caveat notwithstanding, I submit that Awoyemi should be regarded as a case on the 
proportionality of penalties, rather than a case on the application of free movement.  
The advent of legally-binding value with the CFREU seems to corroborate such an 
interpretation. If the Court were to be asked the same question today, the following 
circumstances would be taken into account. Firstly, Article 51 CFREU states that the 
Charter applies when MS implement EU law. In a case such as Awoyemi, it would be difficult 
affirming the non-application of the CFREU, since the national law would be 
implementing EU law.XXXII 
Secondly, Article 49(3) lays down the universal principle that the entity of penalties 
must be proportionate to the seriousness of the offences. Arguing for the application of 
such a principle to EU citizens only would seem rather unsound. In light of these 
arguments, there appears to be the possibility that the Charter challenges the well-
established link between the entitlement to free movement and the principle of 
proportionality of penalties.XXXIII Otherwise, the right to free movement would become a 
prerequisite of the enjoyment of fundamental rights, which appears in sharp contrast to the 
framework provided for in the Treaties. Now I move on to the second scenario, where I 
discuss Berlusconi and Caronna, and their possible importance for judicial cooperation in 
criminal matters within the EU. 
 
3. Hierarchy and Compliance with EU Law and Refusal of  Mutual 
Recognition 
 
3.1. Berlusconi and Caronna 
The Berlusconi case concerned the interaction between EU company law and the 
implementing Italian law, where, in compliance with EU company law, Italian law initially 
provided for effective (criminal) penalties. However, the law was subsequently amended by 
a subsequent law, which decriminalised the specified conducts to some extent. The referral 
for a preliminary ruling arose in the context of criminal proceedings that concerned facts 
dating back the first version of the Italian law. As a consequence, the alleged behaviour 
could have been subject (in theory) to criminal liability. On the other hand, the subsequent 
legal framework introduced by the newer law set a regime more favourable to the accused, 
but potentially less effective than the former one. Therefore, at stake here was a contrast 
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between the need for effective penalties at national law level for infringements of EU law 
(embodied by the first Italian law), and the respect of the principle of retroactivity of more 
lenient penalties in criminal law. 
The Court firstly stated that the principle of the retroactive application of the more 
lenient penalty is a general principle of EU law, which ‘national courts must respect when applying 
the national legislation adopted for the purpose of implementing EU law’ (emphasis added).XXXIV 
Following the latter principle would have led to the application of the subsequent Italian 
law, potentially contrary to EU law.  
The Court further found that, in case of non-compliance of the national law with EU 
law, ‘the national courts would be required to set aside, under their own authority, those 
new articles without having to request or await the prior repeal of those articles by way of 
legislation or any other constitutional procedure.’XXXV However, the Court also recalled the 
principle that a directive cannot determine or aggravate criminal liability, in the absence of 
a national law of implementation.XXXVI As the application of EU law, and the consequent 
disapplication of the newer Italian law, could have set aside those two principles 
(retroactivity and requirement of national law for criminal liability), the Court concluded 
that the provisions of EU secondary law in question ‘cannot be relied on as such against 
accused persons by the authorities of a MS within the context of criminal 
proceedings.’XXXVII 
Caronna regarded the interpretation of Directive 2001/83/EC on medicinal products 
for human use,XXXVIII and the Italian law implementing it. The Directive imposed on the 
MS a general obligation to make the wholesale distribution of medicinal products subject to 
the possession of a special authorisation. Such an obligation should also apply to ‘persons 
authorised or entitled to supply medicinal products to the public if they may also engage in 
wholesale business.’XXXIX This also concerned pharmacists, who according to Italian law are 
authorised to operate as wholesalers in medicinal products. The Italian law correctly 
implemented the Directive through Decree 219/2006. Following amendments introduced 
over the years, that law also treated wholesale distribution without authorisation as a 
criminal offence.  
The criminal liability of Mr Caronna was precisely based on the Italian law 
implementing the Directive. Doubts arose as to whether the law applicable at the material 
time in the main proceedings made pharmacists subject to the requirement of a special 
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authorisation and, in case of infringement, to criminal liability. If not, criminal liability could 
have been established only by means of an interpretation consistent with EU law, as it was 
not explicitly stated by a national provision. In this regard, the Court firstly reaffirmed the 
principle that a directive cannot, of itself and independently of a national law adopted by a 
MS for its implementation, have the effect of determining or aggravating the liability in 
criminal law of persons who act in contravention of the provisions of that directive.XL 
More interestingly, the Court concluded that ‘the principle that criminal penalties must 
have a proper legal basis, enshrined in Article 49(1) of the Charter of Fundamental Rights 
of the European Union, would prohibit the imposition of criminal penalties for such a 
conduct, even if the national rule were contrary to European Union law (emphasis added).’XLI 
What emerges from these judgments is that the CJEU establishes a hierarchy in 
different levels of compliance with Union law. The Court states that fundamental rights 
and general principles prevail over the full implementation of EU secondary law by MS. In 
both cases the Court confirmed the adage that EU law can never result in aggravating or 
determining criminal liability without a national legal basis. More broadly, respect for the 
principle of legality and the Charter outweighs compliance with EU secondary law.  
In the next section, I argue that this case-law can be highly relevant for European 
criminal law, with particular regard to the possibility to refuse mutual recognition on 
fundamental rights grounds. 
 
3.2. The Importance of Mutual Recognition in Criminal Matters 
The application of mutual recognition to judicial cooperation in criminal matters within 
the EU was firstly decided at the European Council of Tampere in 1998,XLII and, as known, 
is a principle borrowed from internal market law.XLIII Introduced by the CJEU with the 
Cassis de Dijon judgment,XLIV it required that a product/economic activity, that has been 
lawfully produced/marketed/exercised in one MS, should be capable of being marketed 
into another MS without further burdens or conditions. Such a principle finds a limit in the 
Treaty exceptions (e.g. public policy or public health) and the mandatory 
requirements/justifications as elaborated by the Court of Justice.XLV Thereby, mutual 
recognition is mostly a sort of negative integration, which facilitates the enjoyment of 
Treaty rights by the free movements of products and persons under a de-regulatory logic. 
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The application of this logic to criminal law has caused a heated debate.XLVI Indeed, in 
criminal matters, each instrument of mutual recognition concerns one or more kinds of 
judicial decisions (arrest warrant, custodial sentence, and probation measure) and abolishes 
the requirement of double criminality for a list of 32 offences. According to this 
requirement, the conduct at the basis of the judicial act at stake must constitute an offence 
in the jurisdictions of both the requesting and the requested states. Once that requirement 
has been removed, the balance in cooperation substantially changes. Indeed, when one of 
these judicial decisions is issued for one of the 32 conducts by MS ‘A’ (the issuing MS) to 
MS ‘B’ (the executing MS), the latter has to recognise and execute the decision without any 
further formality. For those offences not included in the list, the double criminality 
principle remains. However, although the executing MS does not treat that conduct as a 
crime in its own legal order, it may surrender the person concerned all the same, once the 
issuing MS has required it. The automaticity of mutual recognition in criminal matters is 
mitigated by mandatory and optional grounds for refusing the execution, as well as by 
specific rules leaving some discretion to the executing judge.  
The first and most prominent example of mutual recognition in criminal matters is the 
European Arrest Warrant Framework Decision (EAW FD),XLVII which aimed at replacing 
the previous system of extradition between MS. The operation of the EAW in practice 
brought to the fore the thorny issue of the possible refusal of mutual recognition on 
fundamental rights grounds.XLVIII That is mainly so because the EAW FD (as many other 
framework decisions on mutual recognition in criminal matters) do not provide an explicit 
ground for refusal based on fundamental rights reasons. On the other hand, a standard 
clause is used, according to which the FD should not have the effect of modifying the 
obligation to respect fundamental rights and fundamental legal principles as enshrined in 
Article 6 of the TEU. This article states that the CFREU has the same values as the 
Treaties, and that the European Convention of Human Rights and the constitutional 
traditions common to MS form part of the general principles of EU law. 
What followed from this was the flourishing of a heated debate,XLIX fuelled by the case-
law of the Court of Justice on the EAW FD. Indeed, the Court in Radu excluded the 
refusal of mutual recognition even where it can result in a violation of fundamental rights.L 
Thereafter, in Lanigan, the CJEU seemed to open a space by arguing that the EAW FD 
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must be interpreted in light of the Charter.LI Whether or not such a statement can also 
imply refusal on fundamental rights grounds remains to be seen.  
I argue that the case-law discussed above (Berlusconi and Caronna) can be helpful to 
overcome the stalemate. Whilst concerning different situations, the rationale behind these 
decisions can be described as follows: the need to comply with ‘higher’ sources (general 
principles and fundamental rights) prevails over the full implementation of EU secondary 
law. Such a principle can be perfectly applied also to mutual recognition. Where there are 
serious reasons to believe that the execution e.g. of an EAW would result in a violation of a 
general principle, the relevant mutual recognition instrument of EU secondary law should 
be set aside. This would be consistent with the broader case-law of the Court, and enhance 
the protection of individual rights across the EU. 
 
4. Concluding Remarks 
 
In this paper, I have tried to show how the case-law of the CJEU issued in the context 
of free movement can be highly relevant to European Criminal Law.  
Firstly, in Skanavi and Awoyemi the Court linked the application of the principle of 
proportionality to entitlement to free movement. Thereby, EU citizenship comes to the 
fore as a requirement of the proportionality review. The consequence is that a measure can 
be regarded as lawful (or not) depending on whether the person concerned is a national of 
a MS, as such entitled to the exercise of the fundamental freedoms. The advent of the 
principle of proportionality of penalties under Article 49 CFREU will require clarifications 
in this respect. Indeed, that provision states a universal principle, and cannot be made 
subject to requirement of nationality. In this context, one can envisage two possible, 
unprecedented scenarios. If proportionality were to be applied to third-country nationals, 
the relationship between entitlement to free movement and the application of the principle 
of proportionality of penalties would be challenged. Were this not to be the case, free 
movement could be read as a precondition of access to fundamental rights and personal 
liberty.  
The second way in which the case-law on free movement can be linked to European 
criminal law regards in particular fundamental rights and mutual recognition. In Berlusconi 
and Caronna, the Court seems to establish a hierarchy of levels of compliance within EU 
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law. The full implementation of EU secondary law should be set aside, when the latter can 
result in a violation of fundamental rights or general principles. Such a principle can prove 
helpful to the highly debated possibility to refuse mutual recognition on fundamental rights 
grounds. Where there is a serious risk of fundamental rights infringement, the relevant 
legislation should give the way to EU primary law. In this light, a refusal of execution 
seems to be not only admitted, but also required by EU law to some extent. These 
scenarios discussed shows that EU law must be considered as a ‘whole’, and that there is 
great potential to heighten the standard of protection of the individual throughout the 
Union. 
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